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Abstract
We show that parties in bilateral trade can rely on the default common law breach
remedy of ‘expectation damages’ to induce simultaneously first-best relationship-specific
investments of both the selfish and the cooperative kind. This can be achieved by writ-
ing a contract that specifies a su!ciently high quality level. In contrast, the result
by Che and Chung (1999) that ‘reliance damages’ induce the first best in a setting of
purely cooperative investments, does not generalize to the hybrid case. We also show
that if the quality specified in the contract is too low, ‘expectation damages’ do not
necessarily induce the ex-post e!cient trade decision in the presence of cooperative
investments.
Keywords: breach remedies, incomplete contracts, hybrid investments, cooperative
investments, selfish investments.
JEL-Classification: K12, L22, J41, C70.
1 Introduction
A risk neutral buyer and seller contract for the future delivery of a good. Before delivery
can take place, the seller makes an investment which has no value to the outside market but
which decreases the seller’s cost of production and increases the future value of the good to
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the buyer. That is, the investment is hybrid, combining cooperative investments in the sense
of Che and Chung (1999) with selfish investments as traditionally analyzed in the literature
(see e.g. Chung, 1991; Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1994; Edlin and Reichelstein 1996;
Shavell, 1980, 1984; Rogerson, 1984).1
These investments are highly relevant. Consider the famous General Motors - Fisher
Body case, which deals with Fisher Body’s decision to build a plant adjacent to General
Motors. Such an arrangement oered benefits to both parties by lowering shipping costs and
improving supply reliability (see Che and Hausch, 1999). Or consider the example of Marks
& Spencer, which routinely organizes joint trips to trade shows with its suppliers. The trips
enhance mutual understanding and help both parties to identify new products that they
could develop cooperatively. By facilitating bilateral communication, Marks & Spencer adds
valuable items to its product line while lowering the risk of costly reengineering of products
for the suppliers (see Kumar, 1996).
In the absence of contractual protection, the parties negotiate the terms of trade after
investments are sunk and after the quality of the product is revealed. Unless the investing
party has all the bargaining power, that party can only internalize a fraction of the investment
benefit in such negotiations. Recognizing this potential for hold-up, the seller invests less
than is socially desirable (Williamson, 1979, 1985; Grout, 1984; Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Hart and Moore, 1988).
We develop a model where parties write a contract specifying a price for future trade and
the quality of the good to be traded. If breach occurs, where either the seller (the buyer) fails
to deliver (accept) the good, or the seller delivers a good of inadequate quality, the breached-
against party can ask for expectation damages at trial. Under this commonly-applied legal
1In their seminal paper, Che and Hausch (1999) also allow for hybrid investments and prove for a special
informational setting that, if investments are su!ciently cooperative, contracting becomes irrelevant. In
contrast, Che and Chung (1999), who deal with legal breach remedies, consider a dierent informational
set-up and only allow for purely cooperative investments. Cooperative investments were first studied in an
incomplete contract setting by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and are also referred to as “cross invest-
ments” (e.g. Guriev, 2003) or “investments with externalities” (e.g. Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995). Other
articles that consider cooperative investments include e.g. Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Maskin and
Moore (1999), De Fraja (1999), Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999), Segal and Whinston (2002), and Roider
(2004).
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remedy, the victim of breach receives a payment that makes him as well o as performance
would have. We show that, under this legal regime, the contract induces first-best investment
incentives and the e!cient ex-post breach decision when the parties set the quality required
under the contract su!ciently high.2 This result holds independent of whether parties can
renegotiate. However, if the quality specification is set at an intermediate level, investment
incentives are ine!cient and the standard result (see e.g. Posner, 1977; Shavell, 1980;
Kornhauser, 1986; Craswell, 1988) that expectation damages induce the ex-post e!cient
breach decision can be shown to no longer hold. The result generalizes Stremitzer (2008b)
who has analyzed the same legal regime in a setting of purely cooperative investments.3
What makes this result interesting is that another well known e!ciency result for this
setting, due to Che and Chung (1999), cannot be generalized to the hybrid case. Che and
Chung (1999) assume that parties can write a contract in which they stipulate the price of
the good to be traded and an up-front payment. If breach occurs, under which the buyer
refuses to accept the good, the seller can ask for reliance damages, i.e., he is reimbursed his
non-recoverable investment expenses. Che and Chung (1999) show that there exists a price
for which the contract induces the first best if renegotiation is possible. Yet, the logic of the
argument cannot be extended to the hybrid setting. Indeed, it is always possible to construct
2Edlin (1996) also analyses ‘Cadillac contracts’ in the context of expectation damages but makes a dierent
point: He considers a setting where the seller makes selfish investments. In the absence of a contract, there
will be underinvestment due to the hold-up problem. If, however, the contract stipulates the highest possible
quality/quantity, and it is the buyer who breaches the contract, the seller will overinvest. This is because he
is fully insured and fails to take into account the states of the world where it is ine!cient to trade (This is a
version of the ‘overreliance’ result by Shavell (1984) who implictly assumes Cadillac contracts by modelling
the trade decision as binary). To solve this problem, Edlin (1996) proposes to set the price so low, that it
will always be the investing seller who breaches the contract. That makes him the residual claimant and
provides him with e!cient investment incentives. Yet, in order to make the seller accept a contract with
such a low price, the buyer has to pay the seller a lump sum up front. By contrast, in our model, we are
concerned with hybrid investments and need not rely on any up-front payments.
3Che and Chung (1999) had argued that ‘expectation damages’ perform very badly in such a setting
inducing zero cooperative investments. Yet, as Stremitzer (2008b) has shown this follows from their implicit
assumption that the contract stays silent in terms of required quality which will rarely be the case. Indeed,
even if the parties do not stipulate anything explicit as to quality in their contract (express warranty),
the court will do it for them by default, e.g. by requiring the good to serve its ordinary purpose (implied
warranty of merchantability, see Section 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)). Taking
this feature of real world contracting into account, Stremitzer (2008b) shows that ‘expectation damages’
will always induce positive levels of cooperative investments and achieve the first best if parties choose a
su!ciently high quality specification.
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examples where reliance damages induce overinvestment regardless of price. Although the
precise argument is more complicated, this negative result is driven by the well known insight
that reliance damages induce overinvestment if investments are purely selfish (Shavell, 1980;
Rogerson, 1984). For this reason, it is not surprising that overinvestment occurs when
investment is su!ciently selfish.4
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our model and Section 3 derives the
socially optimal level of investment. We then show in Section 4, that the argument by Che
and Chung (1999) on the e!ciency of reliance damages cannot be extended to the hybrid
case. Section 5 contains our main result that first-best investment levels can be achieved
under expectation damages if the quality required under the contract is set su!ciently high.
If not, investment incentives will be ine!cient and expectation damages may even fail to
induce the e!cient ex-post trade decision. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a buyer-seller relationship where risk-neutral parties potentially trade a good. At
date 0, the parties sign a contract (see Figure 1). The contract specifies a fixed price, p, which
has to be paid by the buyer if the seller performs in accordance with the contract and, in the
case of expectation damages, a quality threshold, y¯. Furthermore assume that the parties
can specify a lump sum transfer, w, from the seller to the buyer. At date 1, the seller makes
a relation-specific investment, h 5 R+0 , which stochastically determines the buyer’s benefit
from trade as well as the seller’s cost of production. At date 2, both the buyer’s benefit from
trade, y, and the seller’s potential cost of performance, f, are drawn from the intervals [0> yk]
and [fo> fk] by the conditional distribution functions I (·|h) and J(·|h) respectively.5 At date
3, the parties play a breach game in which it is decided whether trade occurs or not. When
renegotiations are possible, they are costless and can occur anytime between date 3 and date
4 when parties have to make the final trade decision. The potential renegotiation surplus is
4That is, if the eect of seller’s investment on the cost of production is su!ciently large relative to the
eect on the good’s quality.
5Note that both cost f and value y only materialize in the event of trade.
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split at an exogenously given ratio with the seller receiving a share of  5 [0> 1].
As an example, consider the case where an engineering firm develops a new motor for a
car manufacturer. In the first stage, the engineering firm invests in know-how and develops
a construction plan. The know-how may reduce the costs of production and/or increase the
quality of the motor. Once the construction plan is ready, the parties know the costs and
benefits associated with the motor. Only then do they decide whether the motor shall be
produced.
The informational setting of the model depends on the breach remedy under investigation.
Under reliance damages, the court must be able to verify the seller’s investment whereas,
under expectation damages, it must be able to verify the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s
variable costs. Note that this information is also su!cient to decide whether the quality of
the product is below or above a certain quality threshold. While investment may be private
information, everything else is observable and verifiable to all parties. Finally, the following
technical assumptions apply throughout:
• Assumption 1 I (·|·) and J(·|·) are twice continuously dierentiable.
• Assumption 2 Ih(·|h) ? 0 and Ihh(·|h) A 0 for all y 5 (0> yk) and h  0.
• Assumption 3 Jh(·|h) A 0 and Jhh(·|h) ? 0 for all f 5 (fo> fk) and h  0.
• Assumption 4 Ih(y|0) = 4 and/or Jh(f|0) =4
for all y 5 (0> yk) and for all f 5 (fo> fk).
5
• Assumption 5 Ih(y|4) = 0 for all y 5 (0> yk) and Jh(f|4) = 0 for all f 5 (fo> fk)
• Assumption 6 Iy|f((y|f)|h) = Iy(y|h) and Jf|y((f|y)|h) = Jf(f|h) for (f> y) 5 R2.
Assumption 2 implies that an increase in h moves the distribution to the right at a
decreasing rate in the sense that I (·|h0) first-order stochastically dominates I (·|h) for any
h0 A h. In the same way Assumption 3 implies that an increase in h moves the distribution
to the left at a decreasing rate in the sense that J(·|h0) first-order stochastically dominates
J(·|h) for any h0 ? h. Assumptions 4 and 5 ensure an interior solution while Assumption 6
implies that variable costs, f, and the buyer’s valuation, y, are stochastically independent.
To save notation we assume that the highest possible benefit of the buyer is equal to the
highest possible realization of variable cost, yk = fk.6
3 Benchmark
We consider the socially optimal allocation as a benchmark. A social planner cares for two
things: First, he wants parties to trade whenever trade is e!cient ex-post, y  f. Second,
given the ex-post optimal trade decision, he wants the seller to choose the investment level
hW which maximizes the expected gains of trade:
hW 5 duj pd{ Z (h) =
Z fk
fo
Z yk
f
(y  f)Iy(y|h) gy Jf(f|h) gf h= (1)
Twice integrating by parts and dierentiating, the e!cient investment level, hW, can be
characterized by the following first-order condition:
Z 0 (hW) =
Z fk
fo
([1 I (f|hW)] Jh(f|hW) Ih(f|hW) J(f|hW)) gf 1 = 0= (2)
We assume that W(e) is strictly quasi-concave in e. This ensures that hW is unique and well
defined.
6Our main results remain qualitatively the same if this assumption is relaxed.
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Figure 2: Subgame induced by reliance damages if renegotiations are possible.
4 Reliance damages with renegotiations
Che and Chung (1999) show that, in a setting of purely cooperative investments, there exists
a price such that reliance damages induce the first best if renegotiation is possible. On the
other hand, Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984) show that reliance damages perform poorly
in an environment of selfish investments, inducing overreliance. These two results lead us
to the question of how reliance damages perform in a hybrid setting, which contains aspects
of both cooperative and selfish investments. We find that it is not possible to extend the
result by Che and Chung (1999) to the hybrid case. Indeed, reliance damages may fail to
induce the first best regardless of price.7 To show this, we analyze the game induced by
a simple contract specifying price, s, and potentially some lump sum transfer, w> if that
contract is governed by reliance damages (see Figure 2). Under reliance damages, the seller
is reimbursed his reliance expenses h if the buyer announces breach (D¯). If the buyer is
willing to accept the good and trade occurs the seller and the buyer receive s f and y s,
respectively.8 Moreover, whenever the buyer’s decision is ex post ine!cient, the parties
7Since Che and Chung (1999) have already shown that ‘reliance damages’ fail to induce the first best
in a setting of purely cooperative investments if renegotiation is not possible, we focus on the case where
renegotiation is possible.
8In order to stay close to the setting studied by Che and Chung (1999), we stick to their assumption that
only the buyer can breach the contract.
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renegotiate towards the ex post e!cient trade decision and split the potential renegotiation
surplus with the seller receiving a fixed share of  5 [0> 1].9 For example, if y A f, but
the buyer announces breach, the seller derives [y f]+ from renegotiations, where we shall
frequently use the notation [·]+ = pd{[·> 0]. Hence, the buyer will announce breach if and
only if
h+ (1 )[y  f]+ A y  s+ (1 )[f y]+ (3)
or equivalently if
y ? yˆ  plq [s h f + f> yk]= (4)
So far the analysis is identical to Che and Chung (1999) except that cost of production
is deterministic in their setting while it is stochastic in ours. Let us now revisit the intu-
ition behind Che and Chung’s result that there always exists a price which induces first-best
investment in a setting of purely cooperative investments. First, note that the seller’s ex-
pected payo decreases in h, conditional on the buyer accepting the good. Since the buyer
will never breach if price is set su!ciently low the parties can implement zero investment
by specifying s = 0. A very high price, on the other hand, ensures that the buyer always
announces breach. Given the reliance damages remedy, the seller is sure to regain his invest-
ment and, in addition, to receive a renegotiation surplus of [yf]+, which is increasing in h.
Anticipating this, the seller invests as much as he can, overinvesting relative to the e!cient
level.10 Hence, given the continuity of the seller’s expected payo function there must exist
an intermediate price that induces first-best investment.
However, this simple intuition fails in a setting of hybrid investments. To see this, first
consider the case where the parties specify a very high price. Again, the seller overinvests
because his payo [y  f]+ + h  h is strictly increasing in h. Yet, if s = 0, it does not
necessarily remain true that the seller chooses zero investments, as his expected cost of
9Note that the bargaining set-up considered in Che and Hausch (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) diers
from Rogerson (1984) who implicitly assumes that parties can only renegotiate prior to the buyer’s breach
decision. Also Lyon and Rasmusen (2004) and Watson (2007) consider alternative bargaining models.
10Technically speaking, the seller’s investment would be arbitrarily close to infinity since Che and Chung
(1999) do not impose any wealth constraint but assume h 5 U+0 .
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production decreases in h. We can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If parties can stipulates a price, s, and a lump sum payment, w, and their
contract is governed by reliance damages, a price inducing first-best hybrid investments does
not always exist.
Proof. To prove Proposition 1, it is su!cient to construct an example where the seller
overinvests regardless of price. Here, we consider the simple case where the seller’s bargaining
power is very small,  $ 0.11 The proof comes in three steps. (i) We derive the investment
level that maximizes the seller’s expected payo. (ii) Let hUG be the investment level that
maximizes the seller’s expected payo for s = 0. We can then derive a condition for which
hUG is higher than the social optimal level, hW. (iii) We show that the seller never invests
less than hUG if the contract specifies a positive price. If the condition that is given in the
second part of the proof holds, it then directly follows that the seller overinvests regardless
of price.
(i) Anticipating the buyer’s decision at date 3, the seller, at date 1, expects to receive
the following payo at date 1:
XUG(h) =
Z fk
fo
Z yˆ
0
(h+ [y  f]+)Iy(y|h) gy Jf(f|h) gf (5)
+
Z fk
fo
Z yk
yˆ
(s f+ [f y]+)Iy(y|h) gy Jf(f|h) gf h=
We assume that XUG(h) is strictly quasi-concave in h for all s to ensure that there exists a
unique equilibrium investment level. Let y˜  s3h3fk + fk and fˆ 
s3h3yk
13 where fˆ is defined
such that f  fˆ implies yˆ = yk and f  fˆ implies yˆ = s3h3f + f (see expression 4). Twice
11It is not necessary that the seller’s bargaining power is marginal, as in our example, to prove that
overreliance can occur. However this example allows for a relatively simple intuition compared to cases of
larger bargaining powers.
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integrating by parts and reorganizing we can rewrite (5) as follows:12
XUG(h) = s h fk  
Z y˜
fk
I (y|h) +
Z fk
fo
J(f|h) gf (6)
 
Z fk
fo
I (f|h)J(f|h) gf (1 )
Z fk
fˆ
I (yˆ|h)J(f|h) gf
 (1 )
Z fˆ
fo
J(f|h) gf=
Hence, the investment level hUG that maximizes the seller’s expected payo is given by the
following first-order condition:
X 0UGh (hUG) = I (y˜|hUG) 
Z y˜
fk
Ih(y|hUG) gy +
Z fk
fo
Jh(f|hUG) gf (7)
 
Z fk
fo
[Ih(f|hUG)J(f|hUG) + I (f|hUG)Jh(f|hUG)] gf
 (1 )
Z fk
fˆ
[Ih(yˆ|hUG)
1
Iy(yˆ|h
UG)] J(f|hUG) gf
 (1 )
Z fk
fˆ
I (yˆ|hUG)Jh(f|hUG) gf+ [1 I (yˆ|hUG)]J(fˆ|hUG)
 (1 )
Z fˆ
fo
Jh(f|hUG) gf 1 = 0=
(ii) To show that overinvestment relative to the socially optimal level can arise for s = 0,
consider the case where the seller’s bargaining power is very small,  $ 0. Inserting p =
0 into (7) yields:
X 0UGh (hUG) = 
Z fk
y˜
Ih(y|hUG) gy +
Z fk
fo
Jh(f|hUG) gf (8)
 
Z fk
fo
[Ih(f|hUG)J(f|hUG) + I (f|hUG)Jh(f|hUG)] gf 1 = 0
and the limit as  goes to zero is given by:
lim
<0
X 0UG(hUG) =
Z fk
fo
Jh(f|hUG) gf 1 = 0=
It is clear that hUG A hW if the first derivative of the expected social welfare function (2)
12See Appendix 7.1 for omitted intermediate steps.
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evaluated at hUG is negative:13
Z 0(hUG) =
Z fk
fo
([1 I (f|hUG)]Jh(f|hUG) Ih(f|hUG)J(f|hUG)) gf 1 ? 0 (9)
+,+
Z fk
fo
[I (f|hUG)Jh(f|hUG) Ih(f|hUG)J(f|hUG)] gf ? 0=
This is indeed the case for those parameter constellations where the first negative term in the
second line of (9) is larger in absolute value than the second, positive, term or where the selfish
eect of investment is strong relative to the cooperative eect, Jh(f|hUG) AA Ih(f|hUG).
(iii) In appendix 7.2 we show that the seller invests at least hUG if a positive price has
been specified in the contract.
Even though the proof of Proposition 1 is rather tedious, the intuition behind it is
straightforward. We can see from Figure 2 that if parties set the price very low, say at
s = 0, the buyer always accepts delivery and the seller’s payo is s  f for y  f and
s (1 ) fy for y ? f. Hence, his payo always increases as cost becomes lower, while
a benevolent social planner disregards the cost-decreasing eect of investment for y ? f. It
may thus occur that the seller overinvests at price s = 0. This is especially likely if the
seller’s bargaining power  is low and investment mainly aects cost and only has marginal
influence on quality y. Given this possibility, it su!ces to show that a positive price will
never induce the seller to invest less. This is true, as increasing the price only makes it
more likely that the buyer announces breach.14 Yet, the seller’s payo in case of breach
[y f]++h h is increasing in h. If the buyer always breached investment incentives would
even be indefinitely high. Therefore, investment incentives rise in s.
Hence, the e!ciency result derived by Che and Chung (1999) for reliance damages in a
setting of purely cooperative investments does not generalize to the hybrid case. However,
we will show in the next section that such a generalization is possible for the e!ciency result
derived for the expectation damages remedy in Stremitzer (2008b).
13Strict quasi-concavity of W(e) in e ensures that W(e) is single peaked and thereforeZ 0(hUG) ? 0 implies
hUG A h=
14If the price is smaller than (1 )fo, the buyer still always accepts delivery. Then the seller invests the
same amount as if a s = 0 had been specified in contract.
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5 Expectation damages
5.1 Expectation damages without renegotiations
In contrast to the case of reliance damages, where it is impossible to achieve ex-post e!ciency
if renegotiation is ruled out, a standard result of the law and economics literature suggests
that the expectation damages remedy induces the ex-post e!cient trade decision (see e.g.
Posner, 1977; Shavell, 1980; Kornhauser; Craswell, 1988). Hence, it may be possible to
derive an e!ciency result even without renegotiation.
Assuming the buyer never refuses delivery,15 the seller faces the following decision: If
he decides to deliver the good, he receives the trade price but has to incur the costs of
production and therefore receives a trade surplus of s f (see Figure 3). Under expectation
damages, the victim of breach receives a payment that makes him as well o as performance
would have. It thus follows that if the good is of inferior quality, y ? y¯, the seller has to pay
damages amounting to y¯y. If the seller refuses to deliver, and assuming y¯  s,16 the buyer
receives his contractually assured trade surplus of y¯  s regardless of the good’s quality.
We will now solve the game by backwards induction. If y ? y¯, the seller will deliver if
15We show in Appendix 7.3 that this simplifying assumption does not change the analysis of this and the
following subsection.
16As a matter of real world contracting, s ? y¯ seems to be a natural assumption, as courts tend to set y¯
higher as the price increases. Note that y¯ ? s would imply that the seller does not have to pay any damages
if he decides not to deliver.
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and only if it is ex-post e!cient to do so (s f (y¯ y)  (y¯ s) +, y  f). However,
if the buyer’s valuation turns out to be above the threshold, y  y¯, the seller will deliver if
and only if s f  (y¯  s), or equivalently f  y¯. Hence, for y¯ ? f ? y, the seller’s trade
decision is ex-post ine!cient. We can therefore write the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If parties specify a threshold below the highest possible realization of quality,
y¯ ? yk, expectation damages fail to generally induce ex-post e!cient trade.
The result is surprising as expectation damages are commonly seen to induce the ex-post
e!cient breach decision. Given the seller’s decision at date 3, he expects the following payo
at date 1:
XHG(h) =
Z y¯
fo
Z yk
y¯
(s f) Iy(y|h) gy Jf(f|h) gf (10)
+
Z y¯
fo
Z y¯
f
[(s f) (y¯  y)] Iy(y|h) gy Jf(f|h) gf
+
Z y¯
fo
Z f
0
(y¯  s) Iy(y|h) gy Jf(f|h) gf
+
Z fk
y¯
Z yk
0
(y¯  s) Iy(y|h) gy Jf(f|h) gf h=
Integrating by parts and reorganizing allows us to simplify (10):
XHG(h) = s y¯  h+
Z y¯
fo
[1 I (f|h)]J(f|h) gf= (11)
The seller’s optimal investment level, hHG, can then be characterized by the following first-
order condition:
X 0HG(hHG) =
Z y¯
fo
([1 I (f|hHG)] Jh(f|hHG) Ih(f|hHG) J(f|hHG)) gf 1 = 0= (12)
We can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If renegotiation is impossible and parties specify a su!ciently high quality
threshold, y¯  yk = fk, expectation damages induce the first best.
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Proof. If y¯  yk = fk, we know from Proposition 2 that the seller’s breach decision is
ex-post e!cient. Comparing expression (12) with the benchmark condition (2) we also see
that y¯  yk = fk ensures that the seller chooses the socially optimal investment level.
Note that the parties do not need lump sum transfers to divide the ex ante expected
gains from trade but can use the price as an instrument to do so. The intuition behind
Proposition 3 is that the seller is made a residual claimant. If y¯  fk, he receives the entire
trade surplus minus a constant term, (y¯  s). Therefore his investment incentives must
coincide with the social optimum. The first best can be achieved since a high threshold also
ensures that the delivery decision is e!cient. Note that our first-best result holds even if
the seller’s expected payo function, XHG(h), is not strictly quasi-concave in h for all y¯. To
derive results outside the first best, we have to impose stronger assumptions on the seller’s
expected payo function. We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (i) If the contract specifies a low quality level, y¯ ? fk, and XHG is strictly quasi-
concave in h for all y¯, the seller underinvests. (ii) If XHG is strictly concave in h for all y¯,
investment incentives rise in the level of required quality.
Proof. (i) To see that underinvestment will be the norm recall that X 0HG(hW) = 0
if y¯ = fk. Fixing h = hW, we consider X 0HG(·) as a function of y¯. The seller has lower
investment incentives relative to the socially optimal level if X 0HG(y¯) ? 0 for all y¯ ? fk.17
This is true because, for all y¯ ? fk
X 0HG(y¯) =
Z y¯
fo
([1 I (f|hW)] Jh(f|hW) Ih(f|hW) J(f|hW)) gf 1 (13)
=
Z fk
fo
([1 I (f|hW)] Jh(f|hW) Ih(f|hW) J(f|hW)) gf 1

Z fk
y¯
([1 I (f|hW)] Jh(f|hW) Ih(f|hW) J(f|hW)) gf ? 0=
Note that the term in the second line of (13) is equal to zero whereas the term in the third
line must be negative by assumptions 2 and 3.
17Strict quasi-concavity of XHG in h for all y¯ ensures that XHG is single peaked and hence the following
argument is valid. Note that strict quasi-concavity is a common assumption to ensure a unique equilibrium
level.
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(ii) If XHG(h) is strictly concave in h for all y¯, investment incentives rise in the level of
required quality. To see this note that investment incentives rise in the threshold if gh
HG
gy¯ A 0.
Implicitly dierentiating 12 and rearranging, we have:
ghHG
gy¯ = 
{[1 I (y¯|hHG)]Jh(y¯|hHG) Ih(y¯|hHG)J(y¯|hHG)} gfR y¯
fo{[1 I (f|h)]Jhh(f|h) Ihh(f|h)J(f|h) 2Ih(f|h)Jh(f|h)} gf
= (14)
The numerator of (14) must be positive due to assumptions 2 and 3. Strict concavity implies
that the denominator of (14) must be negative because it is equivalent to X 00HG. Hence we
can conclude that gh
HG
gy¯ A 0.
Intuitively, underinvestment occurs for two reasons: If the product is conforming to the
contract, y  y¯, and the seller decides to deliver he receives s  f. If y A f A y¯ the
seller refuses to deliver and pays damages of  (y¯  s) even though it would be socially
optimal to trade. In both cases, he does not take into account the value-increasing eect of
his investment. Since both sources of ine!ciency diminish as y¯ approaches yk, investment
incentives increase in the threshold value y¯. The result extends the proof of Stremitzer
(2008b) that it is possible to implement the e!cient outcome with expectation damages in
a setting of purely cooperative investment to the hybrid case. As will be seen in the next
section, a similar result can be derived for the case where renegotiation is possible.
5.2 Expectation damages with renegotiations
If renegotiation is possible, the parties use the payo they would receive in the absence of
renegotiation as a threat point. Consequently the payos in Figure 3 must be adjusted such
that the potential eect of renegotiation is taken into account (see Figure 4).18
Recall from Proposition 2 that an optimal contract governed by expectation damages,
y¯  yk = fk, induces an e!cient ex-post delivery decision. Proposition 4 directly follows:
Proposition 4 If renegotiations are possible and parties specify a su!ciently high quality
threshold, y¯  yk = fk, expectation damages induce the first best.
18Note that we assume that s  y¯ which allows us to simplify payos.
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Figure 4: Subgame induced by expectation damages if renegotiation is possible.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is that an e!cient ex-post delivery decision ren-
ders renegotiations worthless. Hence, payos in equilibrium are the same as in the no-
renegotiation case and the investment incentives coincide.
6 Conclusion
It is reassuring that expectation damages, the default remedy of common law, not only
performs well in a setting of purely cooperative investments but also in the hybrid case.
Indeed, the same Cadillac contract which achieves the first best in the purely cooperative
setting also achieves the first best in the hybrid case. Under reliance damages, on the
other hand, parties must fine-tune the contract price, stipulate up-front payments, and
rely on renegotiation to achieve the first best. Even then, they cannot achieve the first
best when investments are su!ciently selfish. Our analysis therefore suggests that parties
should think twice before opting out of default expectation damages for privately stipulated
reliance damages, in contrast to the recommendation of Che and Chung (1999). Indeed,
reliance damages could only be attractive when informational constraints render reliance
damages easier to assess than expectation damages. A more troubling result regarding
expectation damages is that e!cient breach is only guaranteed if parties set the quality
threshold su!ciently high. Otherwise parties must rely on renegotiation to achieve the
ex-post e!cient allocation.
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Finally, our analysis illustrates a subtle dierence between mechanism design and the
economic analysis of real world institutions. As we have already mentioned, the enforcement
of reliance damages requires investment to be verifiable. Then, however, parties should
theoretically be able to achieve the first best by writing a forcing contract in which they
stipulate the e!cient investment level. Yet, we show that this does not necessarily imply
that reliance damages induce the first best. Indeed, the issue is not whether the information
required to operate an institution is in theory su!cient to achieve the first best. It is about
how institutions make use of that information.19
19Both Che and Chung (1999) and Schweizer (2006) prove interesting results, although, by requiring
investment to be verifiable, their insights are not surprising from the perspective of contract theory.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1, Part (i)
If the buyer announces acceptance of the good, the parties receive their respective trade
surpluses, s  f and y  s, and share the potential renegotiation surplus with the seller
receiving [fy]+. If the buyer announces refusal of the good, the seller’s investment serves
as a threat point during renegotiation. The parties share a potential renegotiation surplus
with the seller receiving [y  f]+= Hence the buyer announces breach if
h+ (1 )[y  f]+ A y  s+ (1 )[f y]+ (15)
or equivalently
y ? yˆ  plq [s h f + f> yk]= (16)
Anticipating this, the seller expects to receive the following payo at date 1:
XUG(h) =
Z fk
fo
Z yˆ
0
(h+ [y  f]+)Iy(y|h)gy Jf(f|h) gf (17)
+
Z fk
fo
Z yk
yˆ
(s f+ [f y]+)Iy(y|h)gy Jf(f|h) gf h
=
Z fk
fo
{[s h f][1 I (yˆ|h)] + 
Z yˆ
0
[y  f]+Iy(y|h) gy
+ 
Z yk
yˆ
[f y]+Iy(y|h)gy}Jf(f|h) gf=
The term inside {===} can be rewritten as:

Z yˆ
0
[y  f]+Iy(y|h) gy + 
Z yk
0
[f y]+Iy(y|h) gy (18)
 
Z yˆ
0
[f y]+Iy(y|h) gy + [s h f][1 I (yˆ|h)]
= 
Z yˆ
0
(y  f)Iy(y|h) gy + 
Z yk
0
[f y]+Iy(y|h) gy + [s h f][1 I (yˆ|h)]
= 
Z yˆ
0
 (y  f)Iy(y|h) gy  
Z f
0
(y  f)Iy(y|h) gy + [s h f][1 I (yˆ|h)]
= 
Z yˆ
f
(y  f)Iy(y|h) gy + [s h f][1 I (yˆ|h)]=
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Integration by parts yields,
(yˆ  f)I (yˆ|h) 
Z yˆ
f
I (y|h) gy + [s h f][1 I (yˆ|h)]= (19)
Using (19) we can rewrite (17) as
XUG(h) =
Z fk
fo
{[s h f][1 I (yˆ|h)] + (yˆ  f)I (yˆ|h) 
Z yˆ
f
I (y|h) gy}Jf(f|h) gf
(20)
=
Z fk
fo
{s h f+ I (yˆ|h) [yˆ  (s h f + f)] 
Z yˆ
f
I (y|h) gy}Jf(f|h) gf=
Applying integration by parts again yields,
XUG(h) = [{s h f 
Z yˆ
f
I (y|h) gy}J(f|h)]fkfo +
Z fk
fo
J(f|h) gf (21)
 
Z fk
fo
I (f|h)J(f|h) gf+ 
Z fk
fo
gyˆ
gf I (yˆ|h)J(f|h) gf
+
Z fk
fo
I (yˆ|h) [yˆ  (s h f + f)] Jf(f|h) gf=
As an intermediate step, we can simplify the term in the last line of (21):Z fk
fo
I (yˆ|h) [yˆ  (s h f + f)] Jf(f|h) gf= (22)
First we define fˆ  s3h3yk
13 . Note that f ? fˆ implies yˆ = yk, whereas f A fˆ implies
yˆ = s3h3f + f. In the latter case (22) is equal to zero. Thus, we can rewrite (22):Z fˆ
fo
[yk  s+ h+ (1 )f] Jf(f|h) gf (23)
= (1 )
Z fˆ
fo
[
yk  s+ h
1  + f] Jf(f|h) gf
= (1 )
Z fˆ
fo
(f fˆ) Jf(f|h) gf
Using (23) we can rewrite (21):
XUG(h) = [{s h f 
Z yˆ
f
I (y|h) gy}J(f|h)]fkfo +
Z fk
fo
J(f|h) gf (24)
 
Z fk
fo
I (f|h)J(f|h) gf+ 
Z fk
fo
gyˆ
gf I (yˆ|h)J(f|h) gf
+ (1 )
Z fˆ
fo
(f fˆ) Jf(f|h) gf
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Let y˜  s3h3fk + fk and note that gyˆgf = 0 if f ? fˆ. Then we can rewrite (24):
XUG(h) = s h fk  
Z y˜
fk
I (y|h) gy +
Z fk
fo
J(f|h) gf (25)
 
Z fk
fo
I (f|h)J(f|h) gf (1 )
Z fk
fˆ
I (yˆ|h)J(f|h) gf
+ (1 ){[(f fˆ)J(f|h)]fˆfo 
Z fˆ
fo
J(f|h) gf}
= s h fk  
Z y˜
fk
I (y|h) gy +
Z fk
fo
J(f|h) gf
 
Z fk
fo
I (f|h)J(f|h) gf (1 )
Z fk
fˆ
I (yˆ|h)J(f|h) gf
 (1 )
Z fˆ
fo
J(f|h) gf
The seller’s optimal investment level, hUG, is represented by the following first-order condi-
tion:
X 0UGh (hUG) = I (y˜|hUG) 
Z y˜
fk
Ih(y|hUG) gy +
Z fk
fo
Jh(f|hUG) gf (26)
 
Z fk
fo
[Ih(f|hUG)J(f|hUG) + I (f|hUG)Jh(f|hUG)] gf
 (1 )
Z fk
fˆ
[Ih(yˆ|hUG)
1
Iy(yˆ|h
UG)] J(f|hUG) gf
 (1 )
Z fk
fˆ
I (yˆ|hUG)Jh(f|hUG) gf+ [1 I (yˆ|hUG)]J(fˆ|hUG)
 (1 )
Z fˆ
fo
Jh(f|hUG) gf 1 = 0=
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1, Part (iii)
We have already shown in the main text that the seller overinvests relative to the socially
optimal level if s = 0 has been specified in contract and condition (9) holds. We now show
that the seller will not invest less than hUG, if a positive price has been specified in contract.
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Consider the limit of (7) as  goes to zero:
lim
<0
X 0UG(hUG) = I (y˜|hUG) +
Z fk
fo
Jh(f|hUG) gf (27)

Z fk
fˆ
[Ih(yˆ|hUG)4Iy(yˆ|hUG)] J(f|hUG) gf

Z fk
fˆ
I (yˆ|hUG)Jh(f|hUG) gf+ [1 I (yˆ|hUG)]J(fˆ|hUG)

Z fˆ
fo
Jh(f|hUG) gf 1 = 0=
Fixing h = hUG and considering X 0UG as a function of p, the seller will invest at least hUG if
X 0UG(s)  0 for all s A 0.20 After reorganizing, X 0UG(s)  0 for all s A 0 is equivalent to
the following condition:
lim
<0
X 0UG(s) = I (y˜|hUG) + [1 I (yˆ|hUG)]J(fˆ|hUG) (28)

Z fk
fˆ
[Ih(yˆ|hUG)4Iy(yˆ|hUG)] J(f|hUG) gf
+
Z fk
fˆ
[1 I (yˆ|hUG)]Jh(f|hUG) gf  1 ; s A 0=
Recall that f  fˆ implies yˆ = s3h3f + f  yk. Then, the term in the second line makes
sure that condition (28) holds unless yˆ  0 or fˆ  fk for all f. In the latter two cases, the
term in the second line is equal to zero. Hence, what is left is to show is that condition (28)
holds if yˆ  0 or fˆ  fk. First, since yˆ  0 must hold for all f it must in particular hold for
f = fo=This implies that
s hUG  fo
 + fo  0/ fo 
s hUG
(1 ) . (29)
Now since s hUG A s hUG  yk, we can conclude that
fo =
s hUG
(1 ) A
s hUG  yk
(1 )  fˆ. (30)
Then the last term of (28) is equal to 1 and because the other terms are all nonnegative,
condition (28) must hold. The last step is to prove that condition (28) holds if fˆ  fk. This
20Strict quasi-concavity of XUG in e for all p ensures that XUGis single peaked. Then X 0UG(s)  0 ensures
that the seller invests at least h = hUG for a given p.
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Figure 5: Expectation damages without renegotiation if the buyer can breach.
case directly implies that
s  hUG + fk= (31)
But if (31) holds, I (y˜|hUG) = 1 must be true. Then again, because all other terms are
nonnegative, condition (28) must hold. Hence condition (28) holds for all s A 0 and we have
shown that the seller will invest at least hUG if s A 0 has been specified in the contract.
Since hUG A hW, the seller will overinvest relative to the socially e!cient level for any price.
7.3 Allowing for Buyer’s breach
7.3.1 Expectation damages without renegotiation
Rather than assuming ad hoc that the buyer never breaches the contract under expectation
damages, we now show that legal remedies of contract law always induce the buyer to accept
delivery.
Conforming quality, y  y¯.
If quality is conforming, non-acceptance (D¯) of the seller’s good constitutes breach.
Hence, the seller can recover damages of [s  f]+ (Figure 5). The buyer will accept the
good if
y  s  [s f]+ / y 
½
s if s  f
f otherwise = (32)
The natural assumption, y¯ A s, implies that (32) must hold. The first case, s  f, must
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hold because y  y¯ A s. The second case can only occur if s A f. Then, since y  y¯ A s it
must hold that y A f. Hence, the buyer will accept delivery in equilibrium.
If, on the other hand, the seller breaches by either refusing delivery or by delivering
a good of non-conforming quality, we need to consider two cases. This is because, under
the substantial performance doctrine of common law, dierent remedies will be available
depending on whether the non-conformity is only partial or amounts to total breach. Let
us define partial breach as a realization of y which is lower than the quality threshold y¯
but greater than or equal to some cut-o value yWE. Similarly, let total breach be defined
as a realization of y which is lower than yWE (non-delivery is always considered to be total
breach).
Non-conformity constitutes partial breach, yWE  y ? y¯.
If quality is non-conforming but breach due to non-conforming quality is only partial,
yWE  y ? y¯, the buyer is only allowed to demand damages for partial breach. Therefore, if
the buyer rejects, the supplier can recover damages of [s f (y¯  y)]+. For y¯ A s, we see
that y¯  s A 0  [s f (y¯  y)]+. Hence the buyer will accept delivery.
Non-conformity constitutes total breach, y ? yWE.
If the non-conformity amounts to total breach, y ? yWE, the buyer can terminate the
contract and ask for restitution (R) to recover any progress payment that he might have
made to the seller. As the good has no value to the seller, both parties receive zero payo.
Alternatively, the buyer can recover damages for total breach, [y¯s]+. Hence the buyer will
receive y¯  s if he accepts the good and since we assume y¯ A s, he will also receive y¯  s if
he rejects the good. Assuming the buyer accepts if he is indierent, the buyer will accept
delivery in equilibrium.
7.3.2 Expectation damages with renegotiation
If we assume that parties renegotiate towards the ex-post e!cient trade decision, adjustments
to the payos in Figure 5 need to be made. For example, if the buyer rejects the seller’s good
when trade is e!cient, y A f, the parties renegotiate and split the resulting surplus, y  f,
23
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Figure 6: Expectation damages with renegotiation if the buyer can breach.
according to their respective bargaining powers. Similarly, the parties will renegotiate if the
buyer accepts the good, even though f A y. We make one additional and crucial assumption
with respect to yWE, which we did not need in the case where renegotiation was ruled out:
Under the substantial performance doctrine of common law, the buyer may only treat the
non-conformity as total breach if y ? yWE  y¯. In civil law countries a similar provision
requires non-conformity to be "fundamental". One test to determine if non-conformity can
be treated as total breach is whether or not the buyer still has an interest in the good despite
non-conformity (in this case the non-conformity is only partial). We assume that the court
will conclude that such an interest exists whenever the parties would freely renegotiate to
trade: y A f. This implies setting yWE = f (see Figure 6).21
Conforming quality, y  y¯ A yWE = f.
The buyer will accept the good if
y  s+ (1 ) [f y]+  [s f]+ + (1 ) [y  f]+ +, (33)
y  s  [s f]+ + (1 )(y  f)
or
y  s 
½
1 )(y  f) if s ? f
f s+ (1 )(y  f) if s  f = (34)
The first case, s ? f, holds if y  s3f + f. This must be true as y  y¯ implies y A f and
21Note that we continue to assume that s  y¯. This allows us to simplify payos.
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the first case can only occur if s ? f. The second case holds because y f  (1 )(y  f).
Hence the buyer will accept in equilibrium.
Non-conformity constitutes partial breach, yWE = f  y ? y¯.
The buyer will accept the good if
y¯  s+ (1 ) [f y]+  [s f (y¯  y)]+ + (1 ) [y  f]+ +, (35)
y¯  s  [s f (y¯  y)]+ + (1 ) (y  f)
or:
y¯  s (1 ) (y  f) 
½
0 if y  f  y¯  s
y¯  s (y  f) if y  f A y¯  s =
In the first case, the condition must hold since y¯ s  y f  (1 ) (y f). In the second
case, the condition must hold because y  f A 0 and (1 )  1. Hence the buyer will
accept in equilibrium.
Non-conformity constitutes total breach, y ? yWE = f.
As y¯ s+ (1) [y  f]+ A (1) [y  f]+ the buyer chooses ED if he rejects delivery.
The buyer will therefore accept if:
y¯  s+ (1 ) [f y]+ A y¯  s+ (1 ) [y  f]+ +,
y¯  s+ (1 ) (f y) A y¯  s>
which will always hold for y ? f.
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